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1.￿Two examples
To most minds, economic competition is an inherent feature of capitalism,
and one whose unpleasant consequences, if any, are vastly offset by its
positive effects in terms of allocative efficiency (for a recent statement, see
Joseph Stiglitz, 1994) or in terms of innovative impulse (see Israel Kirzner,
1994). Therefore, competition as an economic motive is enjoying a
privileged status, and recent competition policy orientations show that
many governments aim at making competition as widespread as possible.
In this paper, I would like to challenge this virtually unchallenged position,
and I would like to do so at a very fundamental level. What started me
wondering—and worrying—about competition as an economic motive
were two examples of which we might easily encounter instances in our
daily lives. The first example is very micro–economic, the second more
macro–oriented. They both illustrate a fundamental trait of competitive
behavior, namely the negation of the “other–ness” of other individuals, a
trait which is intuitively well known but which I find it urgent to discuss
and criticize anew from the standpoint of the philosophy of economics. I
will show how crucial a role “consumerism,” or the reification of the
consumer, plays in this fundamental trait of economic competition. Here
are the two examples.
Example 1. You are working full time at a chemical firm, doing research
for pharmaceutical applications. Your boss is quite satisfied with your work;
you have reasonable success and some of your findings have already led to
small innovations in some medications. You have a family, and your wife
and yourself are raising three children. Although you are not reluctant towork longer hours on some days when there are urgent deadlines to meet,
you try to be home by 6.30 or 7 pm, and on week–ends you try not to take
any work home in order to be as fully available as possible to your family, to
go out with the children or to visit the grandparents. Lately the competition
from the large German concerns has been growing, however, and your boss
is just a bit more edgy than in the past. Suddenly, your long–time colleague
quits her job because of an illness. She is replaced by a younger man, who is
single and likes to spend most of his nights at the office working. He usually
goes home at 2 or 3 am. He is also rather brilliant and, because he has so
much time to work, quickly gathers an impressive output of results. After a
few months, your boss calls you to his office and tells you that your research
is now moving a bit too slowly, and that you will have to come in on
Saturdays if you are to match your new colleague’s performance. In the light
of the tightening competition, he says, there isn’t much choice. Since the
newcomer and some others start coming in on Saturdays, and sometimes
also on Sunday afternoons, you end up having to do it too. Your family life
suffers a huge setback, and your relationship with your wife deteriorates.
After two years, she asks for a divorce, and you fall into a depression.
Example 2. You are head of a small factory which employs fifteen workers
for the production of XZY rubber tubes, a special kind of tube used for the
fabrication of some specific ecological automobile motors, called “Eco–
motors.” You are currently the world’s largest producer and your business is
doing well. You pay your employees well, and there is little or no social
unrest in the firm. Suddenly, the European Union passes a new regulation
which imposes Eco–motors for the whole of the car production flowing into
Europe. Very quickly, you are submerged by orders; in South–East Asia,
several competing firms start mass production of XZY tubes with labor costs
ten times lower than yours. Within months, your order book empties. You
start by trying to face the competition and reducing your employees’ wages.
Reluctantly, they accept because they see it is in the firm’s and their own
interest. However, virtually all car builders now purchase their XZY tubes
in Asia, and a year later you are near bankruptcy. After a few more weeks,
you have no choice but to close down; you and your fifteen workers are
suddenly without a job.2.￿Three arguments, one justification
These two examples strike me as paradigmatic of the everyday drama caused
by the very existence of economic competition, especially nowadays with so
many markets extending across the whole planet.￿1 A striking feature in
both cases is that no one is, in any obvious sense, responsible for what
happens to individuals and/or to firms. Everything is going well and,
suddenly, “something” occurs which causes a breakdown. This “something”
is clearly of a systemic nature; it is a kind of anonymous force which,
through the occurrence of an exogenous event (a colleague’s illness together
with increased pressure from competitors, or the creation of a new
environmental regulation), suddenly rushes in and makes the whole—
often carefully constructed—edifice topple over, whether at the individual
or at the firm level. Something which was working well is suddenly,
because of largely exogenous reasons, no longer working at all, through no
clear desert on the part of the “victim.” In neither example is any particular
laziness or incompetence involved.
One might argue that these are simply two obvious illustrations of the
general principle that individual fates are bound together within the social
system. After all, no man is an island and decisions made by others
influence our daily lives in numerous ways, most of the time through no
fault of our own. No one can be protected 100% against the negative
externalities of other people’s decisions, and in any case providing such
100% protection by forbidding all decisions which harm anyone would very
probably paralyze the whole economic process because it would lead to
massive infrigements upon the liberty of decision makers. Proponents of a
utilitarian view of things may moreover argue that while there are indeed
negative effects of economic competition, they are vastly counterbalanced by
positive effects for the bulk of consumers through lower prices, improved
quality, and so on. A few unfortunate cases, they argue, should not be a
deterrent to improve overall welfare; they can be mended on an individual
basis by reconversions, solidarity funds, and the like—as is in effect being
done within our present–day social security systems. So competition, a bit
like democracy, is considered to be the “least bad” system. (And in that sense
1 The two examples make it clear that, in this whole article, I will be viwing competition
as a process of effective dynamic interaction between individuals, rather than — as is
often the case in standard economic theory — viewing competition as an abstract state of a
given system (the “perfectly competitive” Arrow–Debreu economy).it is probably no casualty that political democracy coupled with a
competitive market economy is the socio–economic ideal currently
skyrocketting as the undisputed point of reference.)
The argument is powerful and widespread, and no serious analyst of
economic competition can afford to overlook it. Let us probe its content a
bit. It has an immediate ring of conservatism: individual fates are tied
together within the social system, and this supposedly implies an
acceptance, by all individuals, of the competitive principle. The system as it
is somehow demands an unconditional acceptance, and does so in much
the same way as the climate or some other natural being demands
acceptance. Such a presentation of current capitalism as the virtually only
way of tying individual fates together is, of course, valid only if current
capitalism can be shown to be, in a way, a reflection of “natural” or even
“ontological” imperatives; in other words, the defendents of the
conservative argument are, whether they acknowledge it or not, referring
back  to an idea of “things as they are,” and they are claiming that current
capitalism, with the principle of competition at its center, is the adequate
reflection of “things as they are.”  But they are, moreover—and this is
absolutely crucial—, claiming that the most appropriate (or at least the fatal)
option is to shape society according to “things as they are.” So there is a
threefold decomposition which proves instructive:
Argument A:
A(i) There exists an ontology, i.e., a way to describe
“things as they are.”
A(ii) Competitive capitalism is the arrangement which
reflects this ontology.
A(iii) What is ontological is also what is normative.
Now, argument A is obviously not an ethical argument; one would
much rather call it a “fatalistic” argument, based on the premiss (A(iii)) that
the true nature of things (supposing, with A(i), that it can be discovered)
should be what determines the actual functioning of society. In fact, point
A(iii) reflects a kind of stoic attitude according to which that which “is”
cannot be stopped, and hence must be accepted. I will argue that within the
standard conceptual framework of economics, this is the fundamental
justification of competition. To understand why, let us see look at the two
main “alternative” arguments in favor of competition.
Ontology could be challenged on grounds of the obvious fact that the
organization of society and of economic life relies fundamentally on humanagency. Members of a society have the power—at least in the kinds of society
I will be investigating here—to influence the way in which the economy
functions; the principle of competition can hardly be labelled a “fatality.”
This is all the more so because defenders of competition rather often invoke
the argument of the doux commerce, according to which economic
“conflict” is itself already a strongly sublimated version of armed conflict;
competition, as it were, appears as a means that human beings have found
in order to avoid bloody warfare. But has this argument about civilization
any reason to stop there? If economic competition is one way to sublimate
natural aggressiveness, does it follow that it is the only one, let alone the
best one? A flaw of the ontological argument, then, seems to be that it has
no means to justify why common sense, education, and so on, are unable to
move Man beyond competition. Somehow, the civilizing process is
believed to possess an inherent limit, and economic competition is singled
out as the optimal balance between, roughly, the desire to kill and the need
to cooperate in order not to be killed.
So it seems that anyone who is not shocked by the two examples I gave
would have to come up with a more convincing argument than a mere
recourse to ontology or natural law. The most immediate one is simply—as
implicitly contained in the utilitarian view outlined earlier—that
competition is good for society. It exerts people to make the greatest possible
efforts out of fear of losing positions or advantages, it imposes a tendency
for prices to be as low as possible (which means, basically, equal to marginal
cost), and it supposedly—although this argument is highly questionable in
any market where customers are not well informed about the product—also
promotes high quality and reliability. Furthermore, these advantages are
assumed to more than offset the drawbacks illustrated in my above
examples. Therefore, competitive capitalism ought to be encouraged because
of its overall positive effect on social welfare. In a nutshell, we have
therefore:
Argument B:
B(i) The aim of society is to maximize total welfare.
B(ii) Competitive capitalism is the arrangement which
maximizes total welfare.
In argument B, the principle of competition is, in a way, instrumental in the
attainment of a consequentialist objective, namely the maximization of
total welfare. (I should note that an ordinalist equivalent of this claimwould be that competition leads to a Pareto efficient allocation of resources.
This is weaker than the idea of maximizing total welfare, but it is obviously
in the same spirit.) A related, but in fact different, defense of competition
lies in a deontological view according to which the principle of competition
promotes effort—both in work intensity and in quality—which, in itself, is a
good:
Argument C:
C(i) The aim of society is to maximize the quantity of
effort exerted by its members.
C(ii) Competitive capitalism is the arrangement which
maximizes this quantity of effort.
Although B and C are often confused in casual discussion, and there is
good reason for this: although they appear to be different, they in fact have a
common basis. C is subsumed in B. The underlying logic is that, through
lower prices, better quality and wider choice, people will be better off.
Underlying the argument for maximum effort is an idea of making
mankind ever more felicitous through the provision—through increased
effort—of ever cheaper, ever better and diverse commodities and services.
The argument of “virtuous” competition draws its substance from the
argument of “welfare–maximizing” competition. So clearly, argument C(ii)
gets its ultimate validity from argument B(ii).
Argument B constitutes is usually considered to be a moral advocacy of
competition. At first glance, it appears to be moral in a sense in which
argument A is not, as it makes  explicit reference to an idea of goodness.
Indeed, this is why I said B and C were usually called in to supplement
argument A. However, this is really only a superficial difference, because in
fact argument A(ii) is just as implicit in argument B(ii) as the latter was in
argument C(ii). In other words, B (and hence C) in fact presupposes A, in the
sense that “the best  way for things to be” is best because it is also the way
things are. Total–welfare maximization, then, also corresponds to what is
ontological. This is because, if one views competition as oriented towards
the maximization of individual welfare — as the ontological argument,
which bears upon “human nature,” must presuppose, and as economics
also presupposes since it relies on the basic postulate of utility maximization
— total welfare turns out to be maximized as well. In fact, the arguments in
B and C which rely on a notion of “goodness” cannot dispense with an
ontological foundation of this goodness, and one based on the particular
ontological postulates of economics. This means that in fact A, B and C areall embedded into one another: ontology is subsumed in welfare
maximization, which itself is subsumed in the virtue of maximal effort.
The argument which brings A, B and C together into one single justification
is that (i) economic competition is instrumental in maximizing effort,  that
(ii) maximal effort is good for society as a whole, and that (iii) what is good
for society as a whole is for people to behave according to their ontology,
that is, according to the way economisist believe people do act. Hence
competition is fine finalis justified only on ontological grounds. It is best for
people because it allows people to behave “naturally.” In Heideggerian
terms (see Heidegger, 1927), competitive behavior is part and parcel of Man’s
Dasein, his “being–in–the–world,” marked by Man’s deeply entrenched care
for himself (Sorge).￿2
Although all three arguments in favor of competition are nested
arguments, they nevertheless deserve to be kept distinct. The reason is that
they share a basic feature which turns out to play a substantial role in the
analysis of competition: they all  give a reason for the necessity of sacrificing
existing initiatives (be they individual jobs or whole firms) for the sake of
ever more “efficient” ones. None of them is prepared to see in the
unfortunate pharmaceutical employee or the unlucky manager of the car–
tube factory as anything other than sad but necessary casualties of a
fundamentally virtuous—or at least unstoppable—process. Their answer to
my above examples is simply, “Yes, tough luck, but there’s a higher force at
work here, you see￿…” In all three cases, there is at work a totality, as it were,
which views individual selves as substitutable entities.
3.￿Instrumentalization
Although I agree fundamentally with neither of them, I realize that both
arguments B and C—which have turned out to be two versions of the
ontological argument A—might be defended as justifications of the
necessity of individual sacrifice. In B, individual sacrifice is justified simply
2 Martin Heidegger’s central notion of “care” (Sorge) cannot be developed here. It pertains
essentially to the phenomenological description of what it means for Man to “be.” Care is
the mode in which all of us “are–in–the–world”: we care for our well–being, we seek to
perpetuate our being—the latter meaning not just needs satisfaction but any modality of
being, such as for instance social life (“being–with–others”). This is quite close to what
John Broome (1991) advocates when he says that the economic notion of “utility” ought to
be confined strictly to the representation of preferences (rather than pure welfare or need
satisfaction). The two basic modes of being posited by Heidegger, “being–alone” and
“being–with,” are analyzed nicely (though with a fair degree of simplification) in the
four first chapters of Stephen Batchelor (1983).by the requirement of adding to total welfare, a well–known consequence of
utilitarian reasoning. In C, individual sacrifice is justified by the lack of
sufficient effort by the “victims”: The pharmaceutical employee could have
worked harder and could have matched his young colleague’s performance;
he just was apparently not willing to do so. Similarly, the workers in the
tube plant could have matched the Asian competitors’ performance; but
apparently, their life aspirations kept them from accepting that their salary
be divided by ten￿…￿3 The fundamental objection against either argument is
that they both instrumentalize human lives for the sake of a norm of
totality—total welfare, or the intrinsic moral goodness of effort.
Admittedly, the two totalities are of a rather different nature. Whereas
the total–utility objective clearly involves the instrumentalization of
human existence because some individuals are sacrificed for greater overall
welfare, a subordination to an ethics of effort might be argued to be, after all,
simply one way of getting something valuable out of people’s lives. Our
existence, it can be argued, is anyway given to us for the fulfillment of
something, and this “something” necessarily requires the use of certain
means; if following an ethics of effort represents an instrumentalization of
human existence, then so does any other ethical norm. This argument is,
indeed, worth dwelling on. It forces us to make more explicit our unease
with argument C—and by the same token, perhaps with all overarching
ethical norms potentially present in the principle of competition.
The problem with example 1 is, in fact, that our pharmaceuticals
employee ends up losing his job because he does not comply with the single
most demanding standard, namely his young colleague’s effort input.
Example 2 displays a similar feature. And I think a central characteristic of
competition—indeed, the characteristic which makes competition so
likeable for many liberals—is that it forces upon all contestants, at all times,
the single most demanding standard of the moment, one which in most
cases has arisen exogenously and quite independently of anyone’s desert or
laziness, and demands that this standard be met from now on, lest the
“losers” be ejected from the newly re–formatted contest. This periodical re–
3 Those economists who do not believe in the ability of “the market” to attain instant
equilibrium will usually invoke the existence of “adjustment costs.” If competition
suddenly forces a whole firm to relocate and demands of the workers that they move from
Belgium to Portugal if they want to keep their jobs, this is analyzed under the rather
impersonal heading of adjustment costs due to sluggish labor mobility. The impersonality
of labels such as this is, as we shall see below, one of the reasons why economists usually
fail to grasp the full extent of the violence of competition.formatting is the essence of the competitive process. It ensures that all
market participants are “kept on their toes.” The increasing sophisitication
of means of communication and the evolution of many markets into world
markets have made this sensitivity to re–formatting even greater; example
2 is a perfect instance of how easily exogenous pressures from even faraway
foreign competitors can speed up the destruction of some market actors.
Widespread competition forces a commitment to continually keep up with
the highest quality and lowest price standards existing, or at least with the
highest quality/ price ratio available on the market. As such, it is a simple
and efficient provider of incentives, and all competition policies are aimed
at making this provider of incentives work as well as possible.
It is hard to deny the validity of the claim that competition creates
incentives; and still, I feel great unease with this idea when it comes to its
concrete, daily consequences. The reason is that, again, in the examples I
have given there is nothing particularly wrong with people’s behavior as
producers. Simply, it turns out that at some point in time, their usual input
of effort, which ensured their success up to that moment, suddenly becomes
insufficient. Work effort is thus singled out as the only ethically relevant
dimension of human action, at the expense of all other dimensions of life.
Even the often discussed “protestant work ethic,” which takes as its premiss
the idea that work is morally important because it disciplines human life
and makes individuals realize the interdependence of their fates—even this
work ethic cannot justify the subordination of individual levels of effort to
the comparison–driven incentive mechanism which underlies competitive
forces. The instrumentalization underlying argument C is not, upon deeper
reflexion, deducible from any specific “work ethic”; it flows rather from a
much deeper source located on the demand side of the market.
4.￿Consumerism
Underlying everything that has been said up to now about the consequences
of the competitive process is the following obvious, but often insufficiently
emphasized truth: There would be no competition, ever, if there were no
actively searching consumers. Neo–classical theory has it clear that
consumers’ search activity—i.e., the search for the highest quality/ price
ratio—is absolutely central in driving competition. The higher the search
costs, the less perfect the information of consumers, and the less strong
competition. This is obvious. In fact, consumer search activity is really theonly driving force of competition, both effective and potential. (In the case
of potential competition, what is important is the “expected” search activity
of consumers in the hypothetical case of entry of a cheaper and/or higher–
quality competitor.) This being established, it becomes clear that it is the
attitude of the consumers, i.e., of the demand side of the market, which
caters to the producers’ being “choicelessly” subordinated to competitive
forces. What drives competition is the fact that each and every consumer is
continually chasing after the lowest quality/ price ratio. Albert Hirschman
(1970) has termed this, classically, the consumers’ ever present “exit option”
under competitive circumstances. As Lutz and Lux (1979, p. 105) put it,
Everybody is struggling to make it, cutting costs wherever
possible in order to survive, but nobody is a winner except
the consumer, who gets what he or she wants at the lowest
possible cost. Here is the basis for the concept of consumer
sovereignty. It means the consumer is king. He dictates
production. (…) The economist’s dream world of perfect
competition is a world of profit maximizers struggling to
satisfy the royal consumer.
While their comment bears mainly on the abstract concept of “perfect
competition” as modelled in standard neo–classical theory (and this is the
case also for Knight’s critique of competitive capitalism, as emphasized by
Kirzner, 1994), much the same can be said of virtually any system in which
there is some competition going on. Even if consumer sovereignty is more
or less limited by the firms’ market power, it is still the fact of consumer
search which propels the whole competitive process. Of course, firms
acknowledge this and feed this search through various channels
(advertising) through which they attempt to attract the consumers’
attention and frequently even to create new needs. Part of this feeding itself
caters to what Frank Knight (1923) saw as the “competitive game.”
Entrepreneurs engage in a race for consumers in part out of a desire for “fun
and games”:
…￿the motive of business is to (…) a large extent that of
emulation as such. Industry and trade is a competitive game,
in which men engage in part from the same motives as in
other games or sports. This is not a matter of want–
satisfaction in any direct or economic sense; the “rewards” of
successful participation in the game are not wanted for any
satisfying power dependent on any quality which they
possess as things, but simply as insignia of success in thegame, like the ribbons, medals, and the like which are
conferred in other sorts of contests. (Knight, 1923, p. 484)
Still, the bottom line is undoubtedly that it is consumer behavior which
drives the whole process—which Knight acknowledged by saying that the
economic system is both a device for engaging in competitive sport and a
device for satisfying material needs: “Economic activity is at the same time a
means of wants–satisfaction, an agency for want– and character–formation,
a field of creative self–expression, and a competitive sport” (ibid., p. 485). In
example 1, the employee ends up ill and depressed fine finalis because
consumers are sensitive to the efforts of German competitors to lower costs.
In example 2, the role of demand (in this case, the car builders’ demand) is
even more direct. In the capitalist economy, the continual shift of demand
from product to cheaper (or better) product is accelerated by the increasing
disconnection between actual producers and buyers: Products are sold by
intermediaries (pharmacies, car sellers) who are themselves subordinated to
the competitive logic, so that the direct producers are in fact under an n–
fold pressure coming from buyers but primarily from the n–1
intermediaries who distribute the products and are free to distribute those
which appeal most to the buyers.
Overall, this points to the increasing anonymity of the capitalist system of
commerce as an important driving force of current competitive forces.
Consumers do not care from which distributor they buy the products, and
distributors do not care whose products they sell, so long as there are
consumers in sufficient number. Even so, the primary driving force is still
the continually searching, optimizing consumer. For him, the function of
competition, the only function of competition, is that of driving prices
down and—if possible, though this may not always occur—quality up.
Competition policies such as that soon to be implemented in the European
Union’s Single Market clearly acknowledge this “consumer–friendly”
function of competition and devise all sorts of rules in order to further it.
The underlying logic is that people as consumers will be better off—that is
why competition is encouraged. Underlying the whole process is, deeply
entrenched, an ideal of making mankind ever more felicitous through the
provision of ever cheaper, ever better and diverse commodities and
services. We are in a purely utilitarian view of society, with a very
important specification: individual welfares depend on material commodity
allocations in such a way that, in the aggregate, any cost and/ or quality
advantage derived from increased competition outweighs any employmentor other disadvantage. Without this specification of individual preferences,
argument B would not have such a weight.
Fundamentally, it is the “reign of the consumer” which makes the
economic system so desperately dependent on competitive pressures and
creates examples such as those I gave at the beginning. Widespread
consumer search and arbitrage leads to mechanical shifts in demand from
one producer to another as a function of largely exogenous shocks. Stiglitz
(1994) claims that “the information provided by competition provides vital
information in judging how well a firm is doing. (…) Should the firm be
trying harder? Is it doing as well as it could be?” Clearly, however, the
process impulsed by consumer arbitrage does more than just provide an
absolute standard of comparison between firms (or, for that matter, between
individuals within firms); it provides, as I indicated, a continually shifting
standard.
5.￿The negation of exteriority
The consequences of this are quite sizeable. The race for consumers (I am
assuming throughout that, roughly, a firm’s profits are positively related to
its market share) obviously provides the fundamental impetus for rivalry
between firms (as exemplified by example 2). This inter–firm rivalry, in
turn, fosters intra–firm rivalry between individuals (as exemplified by
example 1). Moreover, there is clearly a constant attempt of producers to
control this consumer–impusled process by taking over the formation of
needs and shaping them through advertising and through the creation of
“fashions.” This means that there is quite clearly, in the eyes of firms, an
anonymization of customers, which balances the anonymization operated
by the customers themselves among the firms from which they buy
products. This virtually total anonymity, which is a well–kown feature of
capitalist competition, is what makes the sudden consequences of
competitive pressures so systemic and so devoid of any necessary
connection to actual desert—except insofar as a firm succeeds in re–shaping
consumer tastes to its own advantage. Desert appears mainly in this ability
to innovate whereas, as I argued earlier, there is to me no convincing
reason to say that a producer who did not match all his competitors’
performances on an existing market. So there are two groups facing each
other on markets: the group of firms within which competitors are
anonymously facing one another and which is anonymous from theviewpoint of the group of consumers, and this group of consumers which is
in turn anonymous from the viewpoint of the group of firms. The word
“group” should not mislead us here; no large group of firms and/ or
consumers is necessary as is the case in markets with “strong” competition:
Oligopolies and oligopsonies are also anonymous in the sense discussed
here to the extent that they rely on intermediation. (The only case which
lies outside my present analysis is the—very rare—one of a monopoly
facing a market with very few consumers. All other cases display anonymity
in the sense discussed here.) Moreover, competing firms are simply
anonymous entities facing one another in a contest the very nature of
which they fail to control. And it is all these modalities of anonymity which
truly lie at the very root of the instrumentalization operated by competitive
forces.  Competition by its very constitution generates a negation of
individual exteriority, in the sense that it “covers up” individual selves
with a totality inside which persons exist only as substitutable entities. The
other is certainly exterior to me in the sense that he is not myself, but the
other’s  fundamental exteriority, his being a person never defined by his
belonging to any totality, is inevitably denied in the interaction organized by
competition. Moreover, since this totality is always a content of
consciousness, the other becomes “part of me” through this totality to
which I ascribe him. Thus the other’s “other–ness” is fundamentally
negated. (See e.g. Wyschogrod, 1992.)
This is simply a phenomenological statement embodying per se no value
judgment. It is in the fundamental nature of economic competition to
operate such an occultation of individual identities. As within any contest,
in competition the “other” is nothing but an entity standing in the way of,
or being at hand as a tool for, “my” achievement—if this were not so there
would be no “com–petition,” which etymologically means the common
pursuit of a common goal. The other is no longer a person with his own
specific subjectivity, aspirations, fears, hopes, etc., but only one of the
“things” which might bar my own passage or serves my own goal. The
other has become part of the totality which I am facing, and which I fear or
use.
Is this, beyond the phenomenological description, also a moral problem?
I think it is, although many might disagree. In particular, persons defending
conception A will deny that any moral problem is involved, whereas in fact
I think the necessary negation of exteriority is the single most important
moral problem connected with competition, because I do not believe—atleast not as much as some political philosophers in the analytic tradition, or
as most economists—that “society” is just a composite magnitude made up
of entities called “individuals.” One might object that in the competitive
system everyone engages in the game voluntarily; while I disagree with
this, I could even grant it and still reply that voluntarisness does not mean
that any two participants in the game are not denying each other’s
exteriority. (Again, I should insist: Individual x of course sees individual y
as physically exterior to himself, but throughout the competitive process x
views y as interior to a totality called, for example, “my competitors” or “my
opponents,” and since this totality is always already apprehended by x’s
consciousness, in fact y becomes “part of” x, no longer fully exterior.)
In the discussion of this question, I will rely extensively on the work of
Emmanuel Levinas￿(1982a, 1990) who has tried to argue that there is much
more going on in the notion of “sociality” than merely a juxtaposition of
individuals. There is, or there ought to be if the very notion of a
relationship is to be upheld, a unicity in every person which cannot be
erased by any systemic or totalizing mode of thought. This may sound like a
rather unorthodox idea to many, but I think in the reflexion on competition
and its ethical value it holds great promise. For the necessity of my present
argument, I will—because I think there are good reasons for this—identify
competition with warfare, and the “victory” in the competitive race as a
form of “killing.” This may be considered extreme, but it is intimately
connected with the idea that competition ontologically violates exteriority.
Pushing the other aside as I would a material obstacle as part of the
“totality” which obstructs my passage is, ontologically speaking, a form of
killing, even if biological life is not in all cases threatened. In a metaphorical
sense, firms can “kill” one another on a market; customers can “kill” a firm
by arbitraging away from it in favor of another firm; and people can “kill”
one another in competing for jobs or positions. In a much more litteral
sense, a firm can kill people if it decides to relocate and to move from one
country to another almost overnight, leaving all its former employees with
the choice between being jobless and uprooting their current way of life by
moving.￿4
4 It is symptomatic of the ontological orientation of economics, and its evident connection
with Dawrinian evolutionism, that capitalist competition was termed by the Austrian
school, and in particular by Schumpeter, “creative destruction.” Virtually all economists,
from Alfred Marshall (1920)  to Robert Nelson and Sydney Winter (1982), have
emphasized the “creative” side and viewed destruction as a mere by–product of
competition. It can hardly be denied that this is a grossly eugenistic orientation; perhapsNow economic theory will grasp most of these casualties under the
heading of adjustment costs. The reason, it is said, why “market forces” fail
to reach “equilibrium” instantly is that there are various forms of
“sluggishness”—but in fact this sluggishness (for instance in the case of
trade union resistance) is very often rooted in the attempts of individual
human beings to survive to the pressures imposed by competition. It is
symptomatic of the way economics deals with individual lives that the
deep–rooted violence of competition—which we shall be further analyzing
below—is covered up with the impersonal expression of “adjustment
costs.” It is true that, in one way, competition most often does not eject its
losers but merely transforms them: jobless iron workers become textile
workers and then, when joblessness hits once more, they either go on
pension or convert again into—say—low–grade computer technicians.
Rather than being kept in their original jobs at all costs they might, upon
reconversion, be “compensated” for the hardships imposed upon them by
the demands of competition. However, such a compensatory scheme
involves the very same reasoning as that involved in competitive
reasoning itself: individual lives are and remain just “grist for the mill.”
The violence inherent in competition is not put into question; it is merely
softened. My present investigation of competition as a mode of behavior
aims deeper.
Levinas claims that if a criminal or a soldier were to really look his
victim in the face, which would mean really being fully present to the other
as a person who is not himself and is also not an object “eaten up” by his
consciousness, then he could not possibly kill that person. By the same
token, I think one could say that really entering in a face–à–face with a
person would make competition with that person—whether as an
opponent of as a tool—impossible, or unbearable. That is, in fact, precisely
why competition is usually mediated by firms and other “anonymous”
organizations, and why for instance  personalized rivalry is so destructive
from the personal point of view. It is as though we knew that we would not
want to compete amongst ourselves openly, person to person, for jobs or
anything else; so we do it via the whole economic structure. As I explained
above, the positive effects of competition seem to be maintainable only at
the cost of a strong “anonymization” of human interactions.
the profession could profit from sometimes reversing the description of competitive forces
and terming them instead “destructive creation.”But if this is so, is competitive behavior really (1) an inherent part of
human nature, or even (2) a “mode of being–in–the–world” in the sense of
Heidegger’s existentials (see Heidegger, 1927)? In section 2 above we saw that
the answer to both questions was Yes. We saw that competition as a mode of
human behavior could fine finalis be justified only ontologically, that is, in
terms of an appeal to “the way things are” given the particular postulates
that economics makes about human nature. Levinas argues that the
reliance on ontology needs to be abandonned because, precisely, it prompts
the constant interference of arguments about “the way things are” in ethical
evaluation. His whole philosophical endeavor is aimed at ripping ethical
thought from its ontological surroundings; ontology, according to Levinas,
can never serve as the appropriate context for ethical evaluation. Levinas’s
vision will not be used here out of mere exegetical interest. Rather, I will
show that it leads us to apprehending competition as a negation of the
Other as a heteronomous, “exterior” individual. This, as we shall see
presently, will provide us with powerful concepts for a very radical critique
of competition as an economic motive.
6.￿The impossibility of ethically justifying competition
To introduce the discussion, I would like to quote a long passage from the
very last pages of Levinas’s interview book Éthique et infini (1982a), where
the author discusses the question of “fear for the other.” It turns out, I
believe, that what Levinas is saying is of paramount importance for an in–
depth, sober understanding of economic life. Here is the passage:￿
Philippe Nemo.￿—￿But if one fears for the other and not for
oneself, it is possible even to live￿?
Emmanuel Levinas.￿—￿Indeed, that is the question we must
eventually ask. Do I owe myself to Being [l’être]? By being
[étant], by persisting in Being, am I not killing?
Ph. N.￿—￿Of course, now that we are familiar with the
biological paradigm, we know that any species lives at the
expense of another and that within each species any
individual replaces another. One cannot live without
killing.
E. L.￿—￿In society as it functions now, it is not possible to live
without killing, or at least preparing someone’s death.
Consequently, the important question concerning themeaning of Being is not “Why is there something rather
than nothing?”—the Leibnizian question which Heidegger
so profusely commented—but “Do I not kill by being?”
Ph. N.￿—￿From this observation that one cannot live
without murder or at least without struggle, others would
draw the conclusion that one must, in fact, kill, and that
violence serves life and directs evolution. Do you refuse this
reply?
E. L.￿—￿The dislocation [éclatement] of the human within
Being, (…) the crisis of Being, the otherwise–than–Being, are
indeed marked by the fact that what is the most natural
becomes the most problematic. Do I have the right to be? By
being in the world, am I not taking someone’s place? This
challenges the naive and natural perseverence within
Being!
Ph. N.￿—￿As an epitaph to Otherwise Than Being, you quote
a sentence by Pascal: “Here is my place in the sun. This is the
beginning and the image of the usurpation of the whole
world” and “We have made use of concupiscence as best we
could in order to make it serve the public good. But this was
only fake, and a false image of charity. Deep down, it is only
hate.” If, however, one goes along with you in considering
that this is the ultimate, or last, question of metaphysics,
how do you set your own answer going? Will you go as far
as saying that you do not have the right to live?
E.L.￿—￿I certainly do not want to teach that the love of one’s
neighbor and the truly human life entail suicide. What I
mean is that a truly human life cannot remain a life that is
satisfied of its own equality within Being, a life of quietude,
that it awakens to the other, that Being never—contrary to
what so many reassuring traditions are saying—constitutes
its own raison d’être, that the famous conatus essendi is not
the source of all right and all meaning [de tout droit et de
tout sens].
Levinas’s view provides a powerful benchmark against which to test our
own convictions about competition. It must be remembered here that
Levinas’s aim is to criticize Heidegger’s (1927) “fundamental ontology,” not
because it is false—he believes it is highly refined and correct—but because
it cannot, according to him, exhaust the content of what it means for man to
live a human life. Remaining at the level of ontology leads, according to
Levinas, to a constitutive neglect of ethics and a legitimation of violence
and war. He argues in favor of an “otherwise–than–Being” (autrementqu’être) which would consist in man’s going beyond just being–in–the–
world,  beyond ontology, and acknowledging his fundamental and
inescapable  responsibility vis–à–vis the Other.￿(See Levinas, 1961, 1974.)
Individual responsibility, Levinas insists, extends far beyond what any
individual has actually done. It is a “constitutive” responsibility which one
becomes conscious of as one looks straight into the Face of the Other.
(Levinas’s concept of Face is complex; it does not refer just to the human
face as a physical, observable phenomenon; it refers to the general fragility
and vulnerability inherent in any human presence.) By identifying such a
constitutive responsibility, Levinas constructs what he calls a “primary
philosophy” (une philosophie première). This responsibility, which is a
reflection of the Infinite radiating from the Face of the Other, is endless, and
no one can ever claim that he has now done enough and can rest within the
neutral flow of Being. This is the basis of Levinasian ethics—a demanding
but powerful way to bring ethical concern into human life.
We need not develop the whole of Levinas’s analysis here. For our
present purposes, it is sufficient to see what his notion of inescapable
responsibility means and implies. It means that by just “being there,” we are
already responsbile for what our “being there” implies for others. Levinas
intends this not as a deadly and unredeemable moral accusation, but rather
as a description of what “being there” implies—in particular for man, one of
whose fundamental features is to be in relationship with the Other. For any
individual, being at fault vis–à–vis his fellow human beings is an
ontological datum, one that, according to Levinas, entails no appeal to the
effectiveness of forgiveness: “The intention is unable to accompany the act
all the way down to its last ramifications, but the ‘I’ knows it is nevertheless
responsible for these last ramifications. (…) The subject of fault receives the
meaning of his Being from outside; he is no longer the man confessing his
sins, but acknowledging the accusations” (Levinas, 1990, pp. 32–33). These
are accusations we are locked into not because we are intentionally “bad,”
but simply because they are part and parcel of the very fact of being alive.￿5
As we saw in the passage quoted above, Levinas claims that our individual
responsibility is endless because “killing” or “taking someone else’s place” is
part of simply being in the world. Levinas makes it an ontological datum of
5 See Arnsperger (1996) for an attempt to grapple with Levinas’s infinitely demanding
notion of responsibility and to fit it into a more “measured” idea of responsibility by
combining it with the Anglo–saxon notion of “responsibility for oneself.”existence. This is the sense in which “killing” has to be understood within
the present frame of analysis.
To understand the consequences of a Levinasian view for our
investigation of competition, it is important to be clear about how Levinas
views socio–political society in general. The “anonymization” of human
life through competition flows from what Levinas sees as the
fundamentally  economic character of social coexistence. Roger Burggraeve
(1985, pp. 120–121) puts it as follows:
In the phenomenal, symbolic and “non–expressive”
character of work lies its “market value.” The fact that the
will escapes itself, that it does not contain or control itself in
its work, implies that the others can subdue the work, can
acquire it, buy and sell it, trade it. Here we (…) come up
against the “intermediary meaning” or “mediatory value” of
money. In a transaction via money, the work loses its
“personal” meaning (i.e. its reference to its maker) in
exchange for an instrumental or consumer meaning, which
is general, i.e. which can be integrated into several projects
of existence and receive meaning from them. Money, which
makes trading works possible, concretely realizes man’s
“quantification” and “generalization,” on which every
socio–political society (both national and international) is
based.
Indeed, the socio–political order can only reach and treat
subjects via the economic path of works. Neither the
intimacy of interiority nor the “disinterestedness” of ethical
unicity escape it. It can only be directed toward what the
subjects  do, towards their works! It can only occupy itself
with the regulation of relationships between the subjects in
so far as these relationships take place via the objective
mediation of works. The socio–political society “realizes its
essence through works.” This method of approaching
subjects through their works makes possible the state’s
rational universality as well as that of every socio–political
society (both intra– and supra–national), since no thought
need be given to the “most subjective intentions” of the
unique individual: for these are no longer present in the
work itself. Thus the socio–political order is directed towards
a “humanity of mutually replaceable people, of reciprocal
relations” (…)
This (…) leads us to an important negative aspect of every
socio–political society. For a society cannot take into
consideration the most individual of needs, just because it
approaches the individual, not on the basis of hisindividuality and unicity, but on the basis of his ability to be
universalized to a replaceable part of the whole.
Although Levinas does not discuss economic competition per se, it
should be obvious from this interpretative passage that his thought leads
directly into the very problem we are analyzing here. What Levinas’s view
prompts is a deep questioning, going way beyond questions of efficiency, of
the very foundation of economic interaction based on competition. Simply
by being alive within an economic system, we are guilty; each of us bears
responsibility—far beyond our own intentionality—for any of the
undesirable consequences of economic competition because each of us
upholds the system itself by participating in it as regal consumers. Levinas’s
position is a radical rejection of arguments A, B and C together: ontology,
even if indirectly present within the idea of  a  “common good,” can never
justify the encouragement of competition. This carries significantly further,
and broadens the philosophical scope of, Knight’s (1923) earlier conviction
that “we appear to search in vain for any really ethical basis of approval for
competition as a basis for an ideal type of human relations, or as a motive to
action. It fails to harmonize either with the Pagan ideal of society as a
community of friends or with the Christian ideal of spiritual fellowship.”
Levinas even more radically leads us to reject any form of ethical
justification, on the basis of a strict refusal both of an ontological basis of
ethics and of a social ideal based fine finalis on the ontical fact of man’s
being–in–the–world.
How crucial the demand side is in this context is shown by Knight’s
cogent remark about standard attempts to justify competition on grounds of
efficiency and incentives: “Its only justification is that it is effective in
getting things done; but any candid answer to the question, ‘what things,’
compels the admission that they leave much to be desired.” An ethical
justification based on human desire– or even preference–satisfaction is
decisively wanting because it remains short of the transcendental respect for
the Face.
7.￿New awareness and the “work–and–spend cycle”
The dead end into which we are led in trying to justify competition as an
economic motive thus turns out to reflect a much deeper problem
concerning the nature of ethical evaluation. What a Levinasian critiquebrings up is a strong radicalization of a standard critique of utilitarianism—
which we saw to be one of the fundamental doctrines underlying the
justification of competition via argument B. It is well known that the
classical utilitarian moral rule can imply the violation of basic human
liberties (see e.g. Harsanyi, 1992 for a recent statement). However, none of
the classical alternatives to utilitarian reasoning (such as liberalism) will do
in a Levinasian perspective unless they simultaneously question the very
existence of competition itself. As Knight’s older criticism already indicated,
what is intrinsically problematic with competition is not that it has bad
consequences in some socio–political contexts, but that it violates very
fundamentally the ethical—and hence, according to Levinas, pre–
ontological—relationship between human beings.
Thinkers in the analytical tradition of political philosophy may at this
point come up with a significant objection, namely that Levinas is unduly
restricting the extent of social interaction on the basis of a perfectionistic
position about what is “good.” To this one may reply as follows. The
particularity of Levinas’s position is that he locates ethics within the
irreducibility, as it were, of the human–to–human relationship, social
interaction being only an appendix and hence a post–ethical institution.
This seems to me a highly valuable contribution, and one which from
which many anglo–saxon contributions on social ethics might benefit. (On
the incompatibility of Levinas and liberalism, see Ruol, 1994.)￿Moreover, it
can be accepted without going “all the way” and claiming, as Levinas (1982b)
does, that the face of the Other is in itself the face of God as revealed in the
Torah and commented in the Talmud. This surely represents a move into
perfectionism, or at least makes perfectionism dangerously close. Such a
move is unnecessary for my present purposes, however. The idea of a pre–
ontological responsibility for the Other does introduce metaphysical
concerns which are claimed to be absent from most of liberal doctrine.￿6 It is
nevertheless plain that the Levinasian non–consequentialism can be read
6 Although such an absence might be doubted strongly, as recently explained by Ricœur
(1995) and Arnsperger (1995) among others concerning the role of tolerance as a necessary
absolute value in Rawls. Liberal egalitarianism à la Rawls, it can be argued, has a chance
only if all individuals agree on at least one thing: the imperative of giving tolerance the
precedence over their own personal view of the good. When Rawls (1993) talks about
“reasonable comprehensive doctrines of the good” which are apt to attain an “overlapping
consensus,” he must have in mind the idea that a doctrine is reasonable only if it does not
exclude tolerance. This might be viewed as a return of metaphysical concerns within a
supposedly “purely political” theory.in a similar way to the Rawlsian insistence on the use of “primary goods,”
namely, as a formulation of a requirement that every person in society
receive the proper means for the fulfillment of his goals in life. (See Rawls,
1971.) The absolute transcendence of the Other, which lies at the root of our
present questioning of competition as an economic motive, has a status
comparable to the absolute neutrality vis–à–vis conceptions of the good,
which underlies liberal theory: In both cases, the idea is that there is a
sphere of instruments for the fulfillment of individual goals. But
admittedly, Levinas’s position is much more extreme than Rawls’s because
it refuses symmetry and “equality” as a foundation for ethical judgement.
Responsibility for the Other is only an “instrument” for the Other’s
attainment of his life goals in the very fundamental sense in which air or
vitamins are also “instruments” for any life to be even possible. Levinas
locates the I–Other relationship before any social interaction as conceived by
Rawls or most other political theorists.
Still, it seems undue to claim that Levinasian ethics is perfectionistic. If
there is any way in which a Levinasian approach formulates what makes a
“good life,” then the same must be true of a liberal who says—whether
explicitly or implicitly—that tolerance has to underlie all social life. If the
Other’s transcendence and absolute priority are viewed as a perfectionistic
requirement, then so would have to be Rawls’s insistence on equality and
impartiality.  Hence the rejection, on Levinasian grounds, of competition as
an economic motive—which echoes and radicalizes Knight’s earlier
profound discussion—is valid even in a liberal context.
Ultimately, as should be clear from the earlier discussion, the Levinasian
rejection of competition as an economic motive implies a rejection of
consumerism, i.e., a refusal to grant the sphere of consumers the legitimacy
of a merely anonymous search activity to “get the best bargain.” This
founding canon of modern capitalism is what gets the whole “exteriority–
negating” process going. It is, in fact, already itself a negation of exteriority in
the sense that anonymous searching involves de–humanizing in a very
radical way: I buy from somewhere rather than from someone. No doubt
such a radical questioning will sound naive to the advocates of competition,
and even to many of its critics. Indeed, how can this sort of objection to
competition yield any “concrete” path of reform? Levinas himself has been
abundantly criticized for presenting a refined thought on something (the
deep–rooted negation of exteriority) which does not bite into politics. Since
Levinas locates his ethical discourse prior to even any ontology à laHeidegger, there seems to be no way to extract from it any but the vaguest
socio–institutional implications.
This is certainly true, and my aim here is not to defend Levinas on this
point. That his intuition, which we have developed here into a more
precise analysis of the phenomenon of economic competition, is
nevertheless relevant can be gathered from a much more “accessible” piece
of work, namely Juliet Schor’s bestselling The Overworked American (1992).
In that book, Schor carries out a detailed analysis of the reasons which have
led American workers and employees to steadily increase their working
hours over the last decades. She stresses several factors, one of which is the
increasing sensitivity of firms to competitive pressures, and she witnesses
in her field data direct illustrations of my example 1:
… however strong [the] cultural predisposition to hard work,
“workaholism” is to some extent a creation of the system,
rather than its cause. As long as there are even a few
workaholics, competition will force others to keep up. (…)
This suggests that the workaholic can set the standard to
which others are compelled to adhere. (Schor, 1992, p. 70)
To “exit the squirrel cage” created by a totally consumer–oriented society,
Schor emphasizes the urgent need to break what she calls the “work–and–
spend cycle.” This is a cycle whereby through complex interactions increased
and increasingly varied consumer needs are met by stronger competition
among firms and at the same time by rising income standards in the heads
of employees. This in turn leads to longer work hours, which seems to
stimulate the shopping spree even more, and so on. Schor focuses most of
her analysis on the dynamic interaction between rising spending and rising
consumer discontent, and this is a separate issue; but clearly, competition
both fosters this dynamics and flows from it. Schor’s discussion strongly
indicates that breaking this work–and–spend cycle is not alien to the need to
break the mechanisms which propel the competitive process itself. In other
words, the breaking of the work–and–spend cycle requires overthrowing the
“royal consumer” in one way or another. Here is not the place to start
thinking about this sort of reform. It is in fact, in itself, not an actual reform
in the usual, institutional sense, but rather a process of gaining awareness
and consciousness of the deep ethical issues underlying our capitalist
societies and our modes of behavior—quite in the same way as Levinas’s
philosophy calls not so much for overt revolution as for “an extreme crisis
of conscience” (Burggraeve, 1985, p. 122). Like Levinas, although on anotherlevel conceptually and philosophically, Schor advocates a change of
behavior in terms of consumption based on personal conversion, so to
speak: “By understanding how we came to be caught up in the cycle of
work–and–spend, perhaps we can regain a reasonable balance between work
and leisure” (p. 15, italics added).
The kind of problem analyzed in the preceding pages is rather specific in
nature. Overcoming some of the negative effects of competition can be done
with the help of public policy, consisting mainly in restricting, rather than
expanding, the scope of competition. William Baumol (1991) shows how
the integration of ethical priorities into economic behavior is dependent on
policies of coordination through the state because competition on
contestable markets reduces entrepreneurs’ margin for ethical behavior to
virtually zero. On a more empirical and transnational level, the work
coordinated by Riccardo Petrella (1995) also shows the urgent need for
limitations of competition if the instrumentalization of human life is to be
reduced. The problem of the negation of exteriority I am analyzing here,
however, is an ontological problem, and as such is not easily amenable to
policy measures. Restricting competition does not rid what remains of it of
the fundamental trait of exteriority negation. This is a qualitative, rather
than quantitative, problem. Accordingly—and this has been widely
criticized by opponents of Levinas’s philosophy—the requirements are
much more “moralistic” and individual; in the present context, it would
involve the attempt to reduce the inherent tendency of consumers to
“shop,” to look for the “very best bargain,” in an anonymous fashion and
without thinking one moment of the numerous underlying interpersonal
relationships which are thus being jeopardized. Such requirements would
not consist in artificially limiting, or even in forbidding, competition; they
would amount to undermining the very behavioral patterns which propel
it.
Do these requirements, whose content has yet to be made explicit,
invalidate all advocacies of competition based on efficiency or innovation
arguments? Probably not, but the philosophical discussion in this paper
implies that such arguments must be viewed as supporting a principle
which, at a fundamental level, is ethically undefendable. To Knight’s
proposition that competition’s “only justification is that it is effective in
getting things done; but [that] any candid answer to the question, ‘what
things,’ compels the admission that they leave much to be desired,”
Levinas’s positions concerning the priority of human relationship andexteriority prompt us to add the even more crucial question: “How are these
things done?” While economic competition can legitimately be viewed as
the replacement of overt war with the apparently pacific exercise of doux
commerce, it in fact contains a form of deep–rooted violence which only a
powerful philosophical concept such as Levinas’s face–à–face is able to
uncover. Economists stay blind to such a violence because their own
conceptual tools are by construction unable to detect it.
It does appear then that, ethically speaking, a significant — and, I believe,
thoroughly fatal — amount of glory has been taken out of the principle of
competition as an economic motive. That economists might nevertheless
defend competition on the grounds of efficiency and/ or innovativeness is
likely, but in that case they now have to answer quite explicitly to the
question as to why they believe these advantages of competition should
override the very deep ethical defects which have been expounded here. As
economists, we might believe that all this talk about the Levinasian face–à–
face is all good and well, but that it forbids any form of concrete social
organization because it is too particular–oriented, too intolerant of any
“systemic” rules overriding human relationships. And as economists we
may thus be led to defend the competitive system; however, the analysis
presented here forces us at the same time to see this system for what it is,
and to realize what our defense of competition as a mode of economic
behavior entails at a deeper level. Ultimately, the issue is that of (i) the link
that exists between economics and ontology and (ii) the detrimental
consequences that such a link has for the kinds of modes of behavior which
economists caution.
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